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ABSTRACT – Background and Objectives: Delusional misidentification syndromes are
widely present in several major psychiatric and neurological disorders. After reviewing
the recent terminology and psychopathology of the double phenomenon in the literature,
the authors present a case of a patient with dementia, vascular type, where clonal plural-
ization of the Self appeared as a secondary, interpretative delusion after a hallucinatory
type of autoscopic experience. 
Methods: Review of the literature and a case report. 
Results: In the presented case the linear evolution and the interpretative aspect of the
arising misidentification phenomena are predominant. The differential diagnosis and the
distinctive characteristics of the presented case from other potential delusional misidenti-
fication syndromes are also discussed. Brain lesions and neuropsychological impairments
seem necessary, but the full development of these syndromes depends upon the individ-
ual’s responses to his or her defects as much as the defects themselves. 
Conclusions: Overviewing the broad spectrum of concepts on delusional misidentifica-
tion syndromes, the authors emphasize the importance of those approaches which enhance
the disappearance of the classical organic-functional dichotomy on the double phenomenon
and which try to clarify the neurocognitive background of delusional misidentifications.
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Introduction
Delusional misidentification syndromes
(DMS) –characterized by a belief in dupli-
cates and replacements– can occur in several
organic and major psychiatric disorders1-3.
Recently, approaching an agreement on a
clarifying classification of the misidentifi-
cation phenomena, several authors4-6 con-
ceptualise two essentially different types of
delusional misidentification syndromes, as
the Capgras type (misidentificational dis-
turbance with replacements) and the clonal
pluralization type (pluralizational delusion
with duplicates).
In the Capgras type (including Capgras
syndrome, Frégoli syndrome, intermetamor-
phosis and the syndrome of subjective dou-
bles)7-9 the significant issue is the misidenti-
fication of a real person. In the first three
classic forms the patients’ delusion exclu-
sively refer to other people, while in the
case of ‘subjective double’ patients misiden-
tify another existing person, as if he or she
was his own self. Unlike in the Capgras type
of DMSs, in the clonal pluralization type in-
cluding clonal pluralization of a person
(CPP) and clonal pluralization of the Self
(CPS) the basic feature is the delusional
view on one’s existing in plural numbers4-6. 
The phenomenon of clonal pluralization
(CP) is based on the classical term of redu-
plicative paramnesia (RP), first described
by Arnold Pick in 190310. In the original de-
scription RP referred to delusions of redu-
plication of a certain familiar place or per-
son, later however, RP was often used in
several meanings in the related literature.
Recently its definition was narrowed down
to the misidentification of places occuring
in certain organic cerebral disorders, there-
fore it has been discussed as a neurological
syndrome. Murai et al.4 have published the
first case describing the delusional view on
reduplication in functional psychosis and
proposed the term clonal pluralization.
When pluralization refers to the patient’s
own identity, the term clonal pluralization of
the Self is used5.
Concerning the complex psychopatholo-
gy of the ‘double’ phenomenon, autoscopy
should be mentioned, which is mainly de-
fined as a perceptional disturbance, involv-
ing the boundaries of the Self11-13. During
autoscopic experience subjects see an image
of themselves in the external space, which is
viewed from within their own physical
body. Several types of autoscopy have been
described, like the depersonalizational (feel
one’s own body), the hallucinatory (see
one’s own body), and the delusional (know
one’s own body) forms14. 
Methods
We reviewed the recent terminology and
psychopathology of the double phenome-
non in the literature. We present a case of a
patient with dementia, vascular type, where
clonal pluralization of the Self appeared as a
secondary, interpretative delusion after a
hallucinatory type of autoscopic experience.
We also discuss the differential diagnosis
and the distinctive characteristics of the pre-
sented case from other potential delusional
misidentification syndromes.
Case report
The 86-year-old patient was referred to
our department by his general practitioner
because he was talking continuously to his
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so-called ‘twin’. He had no history of previ-
ous psychiatric treatment, and there were no
psychiatric disorders in his family. He had
been a high school teacher for 40 years.
Since his wife’s death he has been living
alone. According to his children, the patient’s
behaviour has changed during the few weeks
before admission. He was talking to himself
and reported about his ‘twin brother’, he got
excited apparently without reason. The pa-
tient’s sensorium remained clear, he was ori-
ented in time and place, and amnesia could
not be detected for the events described. 
During a detailed exploration, the patient
reported with intense emotions that his
‘twin brother’ he had not ever known about
before, stands continuously by him, which
he considered as a miracle to be investigated
by a special medical staff. He stated that he
had seen this ‘twin’ a few weeks ago on an
excursion, which was organised by the high
school he had been employed previously. In
the beginning he saw and talked to him in
the hostel they were lodged at. First, the pa-
tient was surprised by the astonishing simi-
larity in their physical appearance: the twin
looked exactly identical to him, he had the
same voice, he wore the same clothing.
Later on he started to think that this man
could not be else than his own twin brother,
and believed that his ‘twin’ used the same
first and last name. He firmly stated during
his exploration that he felt, he saw, he heard
and said the same as his ‘twin brother’ did in
the next room to him. He did several trials to
prove his unusual experience. They solved
cross-words independently and found exact-
ly the same solutions as the other. He asked
the ‘twin’ to enumerate the paintings on his
wall while the ‘twin’ was outdoor - and the
twin could do it as well.
After his admission risperidone 2 mg/day
was started. Two days later he developed the
idea that he and his twin got fusioned in one
person and they were two personalities in
one body. By this time, he modified his
original experience in the followings: ‘an
announcement came out in the local news-
paper where they were searching for a twin
brother, a son of my father. Due to this arti-
cle a certain secret group made the ‘twin’
show up and organised the meeting between
me and my twin on that excursion’. 
During his clinical examination the pa-
tient’s sensorium was vigil and clear, he was
oriented in time and place, no attention deficit
or agnosia was seen. Perceptual disturbances
could not be explored and his behaviour did
not refer to them. Under the influence of his
delusional beliefs he was still excited and
anxious. Long-term memory deficits and dis-
turbances of abstract thinking could be seen
as symptoms of cognitive decline. 
Detailed physical and laboratory investi-
gations, electroencephalography (EEG) and
computerised tomography (CT) were per-
formed. The CT scan displayed abnormali-
ties corresponding to vascular encephalopa-
thy. The vascular lesions affected mainly the
mediotemporal gyri bilaterally and the left
capsula interna. EEG basic diagram was
well organized without epileptic discharges.
Laboratory results were normal. In the Mini
Mental State Examination (MMSE) the pa-
tient scored 23/30, in the Addenbrooke’s
Cognitive Examination (ACE) he scored
76/100 points, the VL/OM (verbal fluency
+language/orientation+memory) ratio was
28/7. The loss of points was mainly in the
sub-domains of memory and verbal fluency,
whereas he scored well in orientation, atten-
tion, language and visuo-spatial subdomains
of the testbattery.
Although the patient was treated continu-
ously with a low dose of second-generation
antipsychotic medication (risperidone 2
mg/day), the delusional belief on the identi-
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cal ‘twin’ was resistant to therapeutic inter-
ventions throughout his 12 days of hospital-
ization. At his discharge he talked to himself
as to the delusional twin less frequently, he
was not agitated any more, and his behav-
iour became conventional.
Discussion
In our present case clonal pluralization of
the Self (pluralization type of DMS) ap-
peared as an interpretation of an autoscopic
experience. Considering the widely used
classification of delusive misidentification
syndromes by Weinstein2, the majority of
the common features that link to DMSs are
present in our case as follows. Duplication,
as his twin is his duplicate; selectivity, that
an exceptional person (he duplicated him-
self) is involved; dissociation, in spite of the
delusion the patient has an implicit knowl-
edge of his true identity; derealization, as
the patient had the impression of living in a
dream; and adaptive aspect, as the company
of a ‘twin’ is an alternative to loneliness and
ongoing isolation due to ageing and growing
sensory deprivation (difficulty in hearing).
Furthermore, in the presented cases of the
literature, the clear differentiation and the
many times common co-existence of several
types of DMSs (Capgras syndrome, Frégoli
syndrome, intermetamorphosis, delusions
of subjective double and inanimate double,
autoscopic phenomena and reduplicative
paramnesia) were described2. In contrast to
this approach, recently Margariti and Kon-
taxakis15 proposed a potential common
pathogenetic factor underlying delusional
misidentifications and described these syn-
dromes as disorders of the sense of unique-
ness. In the light of this current discourse,
our case can be considered interesting, as
this is the first case in the literature, in which
not the co-existence, but much more the lin-
ear evolution and the interpretative aspect of
the arising DMSs were predominant. 
In the following, we discuss further dis-
tinctive characteristics of the presented case
from other potential DMSs. There is a clear
distinction between the phenomena of clon-
al pluralization of the Self and subjective
doubles (Capgras type of DMS). In the latter
the patient’s delusion of experiencing him-
self refers to a real, existing person, which is
a consequence of misidentification9, so he or
she recognizes physically identical doubles
of the self in other people. Contrary, in clon-
al pluralization, as in our presented case,
there was no misidentified person, but the
delusion on pluralization (reduplication) of
the patient himself, where his ‘twin’ or
‘clone’ was in all senses, physically and
psychologically identical to the patient. Fur-
thermore, reduplicative paramnesia, as a
possible interpretation should also be dis-
cussed. Reduplicative paramnesia is preced-
ed by the disturbance of consciousness
and/or delirium, and is often associated with
short-term memory deficits, confabulation
and disorientation7. It has to be highlighted
that in our case there were disturbances nei-
ther in the above mentioned mental func-
tions, nor in the level of consciousness. Con-
sequently, delirium syndrome and amnestic
syndrome with confabulation could also be
excluded. We suppose that our patient dis-
played a secondary, interpretative delusion
identical to clonal pluralization of the Self,
which he developed after an autoscopic ex-
perience caused by dementia, vascular type.
We also point out that there was no misiden-
tification of the own mirror image at con-
frontational testing in our patient, which is
common in dementia16. Additionally, in
order to differentiate reduplicative paramne-
sia and autoscopic experience, we should
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bear in mind that in reduplicative paramne-
sia there is a co-existence of the double; the
patient does not see the double, nor experi-
ence the double simultaneously in the same
space as himself. In autoscopic phenome-
non the double is mainly seen or felt, while
in RP the double is claimed or assumed13.
Finally, there is a major difference between
clonal pluralization of the Self following a
hallucinatory form of autoscopic experience
(presented in our case) and the delusional
form of autoscopy. In the former, the patient
develops delusions as secondary interpreta-
tive thought contents, while in the latter the
delusions are primary and do not appear as
an interpretation on perceptual phenomena.
Referring to the debates around the clas-
sical dichotomy of psychiatric literature
dealing with Capgras symptom and DMSs,
and the neurological literature dealing
mainly with reduplicative paramnesia17 nu-
merous studies witness growing evidence of
organic background in different misidentifi-
cation syndromes3,18-20. Nevertheless, some
of them underline that no single brain lesion
is specifically associated with reduplica-
tions21. Feinberg22 points out the impor-
tance of the personality in all the phenome-
na of alteration of the Self. He claims that
brain lesions and neuropsychological im-
pairments are necessary, but the full devel-
opment of these syndromes depends upon
the individual’s responses to his or her de-
fects as much as the defects themselves.
Questioning the central importance of the
sequential stages in different forms of delu-
sional misidentifications described by Ellis
and Young18,23, recently Margariti and Kon-
taxakis15 suggested a collective approach, in
which they regard DMSs as disorders of the
sense of uniqueness, presuming that the co-
occurrence of different subtypes implies a
common pathogenetic substrate of delusion-
al misidentification syndromes. We suppose
that in the future careful phenomenological
evaluation of patients with delusional
misidentification syndromes is needed for
proper classification of the discussed issue.
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